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Summary 21 
 22 
Background 23 Antivirals (e.g. oseltamivir) are important for mitigating influenza epidemics. In 2007, an 24 oseltamivir-resistant seasonal A(H1N1) strain emerged and spread to global fixation within one 25 year. This showed that antiviral-resistant (AVR) strains can be intrinsically more transmissible than 26 their contemporaneous antiviral-sensitive (AVS) counterpart. Surveillance of AVR fitness is 27 therefore essential. 28 
 29 
Methods  30 We define the fitness of AVR strains as their reproductive number relative to their co-circulating 31 AVS counterparts. We develop a simple method for real-time estimation of AVR fitness from 32 surveillance data. This method requires only information on generation time without other specific 33 details regarding transmission dynamics. We first use simulations to validate this method by 34 showing that it yields unbiased and robust fitness estimates in most epidemic scenarios. We then 35 apply this method to two retrospective case studies and one hypothetical case study. 36  37 
Findings 38 We estimate that (i) the oseltamivir-resistant A(H1N1) strain that emerged in 2007 was 4% (3-5%) 39 more transmissible than its oseltamivir-sensitive predecessor and (ii) the oseltamivir-resistant 40 pandemic A(H1N1) strain that emerged and circulated in Japan during 2013-2014 was 24% (17-41 30%) less transmissible than its oseltamivir-sensitive counterpart. We show that in the event of 42 large-scale antiviral interventions during a pandemic with co-circulation of AVS and AVR strains, 43 our method can be used to inform optimal use of antivirals by monitoring intrinsic AVR fitness and 44 drug pressure on the AVS strain.  45 
 46 
Conclusions 47 We have developed a simple method that can be easily integrated into contemporary influenza 48 surveillance systems to provide reliable estimates of AVR fitness in real time. 49  50 
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Influenza antiviral drugs are important for mitigating influenza epidemics. The neuraminidase (NA) 57 inhibitor oseltamivir is the most commonly used influenza antivirals (1) and has been extensively 58 stockpiled by many countries for pandemic preparedness (2). The effectiveness of antivirals is 59 threatened by emergence and spread of antiviral resistance (AVR) viruses. For oseltamivir, the 60 most commonly detected resistance mutation in A(H1N1) viruses is the NA H275Y substitution. 61 Before 2007, emergence of oseltamivir-resistant influenza viruses were sporadically reported, and 62 the fitness of detected resistant viruses had always been substantially compromised (3). As such, 63 there was a consensus that AVR influenza viruses would always be outcompeted by their antiviral-64 sensitive (AVS) counterparts, and hence posed only minimal threat to public health.  65  66 Such conventional wisdom was refuted by events in 2007-2008 – a new oseltamivir-resistant 67 A(H1N1) virus emerged and displaced its contemporaneous oseltamivir-sensitive counterpart to 68 become the dominant A(H1N1) strain globally within only 12 months (4). The emergence and rapid 69 fixation of this oseltamivir-resistant virus was not driven by widespread use of oseltamivir (4, 5). 70 This event thus proved that AVR viruses are not necessarily less transmissible than their AVS 71 counterparts. Furthermore, in the context of large-scale antiviral intervention during a pandemic, 72 AVR fitness may be enhanced by the drug pressure on the AVS strain such that an intrinsically less 73 transmissible AVR strain may become more fit than the AVS strain. Timely and accurate assessment 74 of AVR fitness is therefore essential for informing situational awareness and optimal use of 75 antivirals during both inter-pandemic and pandemic periods (6).  76  77 The spread of AVR influenza viruses can increase morbidity and mortality. For example, case-78 fatality risk may increase because antivirals would be ineffective for treating AVR cases. 79 Furthermore, if AVR viruses spread during the early stage of a pandemic, populations at the 80 downstream of global spread will be subject to substantial importation and hence higher incidence 81 of AVR cases (7). In view of such risks, national and supranational agencies, especially the WHO’s 82 Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System (GISRS), have emphasized the need for timely 83 and accurate assessment of AVR fitness (8). However, few advances have been made in data 84 analytics and performance evaluation for AVR surveillance systems. Our objective is to help fill this 85 knowledge gap by developing a simple method for estimating AVR fitness from surveillance data. 86  87 
Methods 88 
The model 89 
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We assume that there is only one transmissible AVR strain over the course of a single epidemic 90 wave constituted by the A subtype or B lineage to which the AVR strain and its antiviral-sensitive 91 counterpart (the AVS strain) belong. We define the intrinsic AVR fitness as the ratio of the basic 92 reproductive number of the AVR strain to that of the AVS strain ( 0 0 0R SR Rσ = ). Similarly, we define 93 AVR fitness as the ratio of their reproductive numbers ( R SR Rσ = ) which encapsulates the 94 combined effect of intrinsic fitness and any reduction in AVS transmissibility due to antiviral 95 interventions. 96  97 We formulate our model under the following base case assumptions: 98 1. The AVS and AVR strains co-circulate during the epidemic. 99 2. Without antiviral treatment, AVS and AVR infections have the same severity such that all 100 infections are equally likely to be selected for AVR testing. 101 3. Recovery from infection with either strain provides complete cross-protection against both 102 strains during the epidemic. 103 4. The effect of viral interference (if any) caused by all other circulating influenza viruses (i.e. 104 those from other subtypes and lineages) and pathogens are the same for both strains. 105 5. AVR fitness does not depend on age. 106 6. Age-specific susceptibility to the AVR virus is the same as that to the AVS virus. 107 Assumptions 5 and 6 are relatively less likely to hold, e.g. high-risk groups may be more likely to 108 receive antiviral prophylaxis, susceptibility to the AVR virus may be different from that to the AVS 109 virus (9). In the Appendix (see Appendix page 5), we extend our method to allow relaxation of these 110 two assumptions. 111  112 Under the base case assumptions, the next generation matrix of AVR infections is simply σ  times 113 that of AVS infections. This remains true in the presence of seasonal forcing and interventions such 114 as vaccination and school closure because transmission of the AVS and AVR strain are identically 115 affected by these factors (see Appendix page 2). As the epidemic unfolds, the proportion of 116 infections that are AVR, denoted by ( )tρ , will increase towards 1 if 1σ > , remain at the same level 117 if 1σ = , and decline towards 0 if 1σ < . The key step of our method is to approximate ( )tρ  using 118 the equation 119 
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where ( )i t  is the total incidence rate of AVR and AVS infections, Rg  and Sg  are the generation 121 time distributions for AVR and AVS infections, respectively. To verify the accuracy of this 122 approximation, we randomly generate 100 epidemic scenarios driven by the UK contact matrix 123 (10) with four age groups (0-5, 6-18, 18-65, and >65) using Latin-hypercube sampling from the 124 following parameter space which covers a wide range of plausible epidemics: 125 
• Initial susceptible proportion of each age group between 0.3 and 1; 126 
• Initial reproductive number of the AVS strain ( (0)SR ) between 1.2 and 3; 127 
• Mean generation time (Tg) between 2 and 4 days; 128 
• Intrinsic AVR fitness ( 0σ ) between 0.8 and 1.2; 129 
• The proportion of seeding infections that are AVR between 0.1 and 0.9; 130 
Figure A1 (see Appendix page 8) shows that the approximation in equation (1) is very accurate. As 131 such, given ( )i t  or a proxy of it (see below) and the generation time distribution for both strains, 132 equation (1) allows us to accurately describe ( )tρ  without knowing other epidemiologic details 133 such as basic reproductive number, contact matrix, symptomatic proportion, seasonality, etc. 134  135 
Inference of AVR fitness 136 Our method requires the following two streams of data (for the subtype or lineage under 137 investigation): 138 1. The incidence rate ( )i t  or its proxy, e.g. based on the daily number of laboratory confirmed 139 infections in the Hong Kong E-Flu system (11), Flu Near You (12), or other proxies used for 140 calculating influenza excess mortality (13). We denote this data stream by ( )i t . These data 141 are typically confounded with temporal fluctuation in reporting rate and laboratory testing 142 capacity. Our method, however, is robust against such fluctuation (see Results).   143 2. Data from AVR surveillance where RdZ  and SdZ are the number of influenza positive isolates 144 tested on day d that are found to be positive and negative for AVR, respectively. The 145 subjects selected for AVR testing should (i) have not been treated with antivirals for their 146 infection and (ii) have no recent travel history to avoid misclassifying imported cases as 147 local cases.  148 
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We substitute ( )i t  with its proxy ( )i t  in equation (1) and denote the resulting approximation by 149 
( )tρ . The approximate likelihood is   150 
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where  , psens and pspec are the sensitivity and 152 specificity of AVR testing. With this likelihood and uniform priors, we estimate AVR fitness σ  using 153 Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods (see Appendix page 3). 154  155 
Validation of the AVR fitness inference method 156 To validate our method, we simulate 100 stochastic realizations of the data streams for each of the 157 100 epidemic scenarios generated earlier assuming that (i) daily reporting proportions are uniform 158 random variables ranging between 0.5% and 2%; and (ii) daily AVR testing capacity is 2, 5, 10, 20 159 or 80 isolates. AVR fitness is then inferred at the end of each epidemic. 160  161 
Case Studies 162 After validating our method, we apply it to three case studies: 163 1. A retrospective study of the oseltamivir-resistant influenza A(H1N1) virus in 2007 – 2008. To 164 estimate the (intrinsic) fitness of this oseltamivir-resistant strain in comparison to its 165 oseltamivir-sensitive predecessor, we retrieve the data on influenza virus activity and AVR 166 surveillance for 10 countries/regions from published literature and public online data 167 (Tables A1-A3 on page 13-17 of Appendix, Figure 3). We assume that AVS and AVR 168 infections had the same generation time distribution because there is no published evidence 169 that indicates the contrary. Based on published serial interval estimates, we assume that the 170 generation time distribution was lognormal with mean 2.8 days and coefficient of variation 171 0.54 (14). We first obtain a pooled estimate of AVR fitness by assuming that AVR fitness was 172 the same in all populations. We then estimate AVR fitness in each population separately and 173 compare them.  174 2. A retrospective study of the oseltamivir-resistant influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus in Japan 175 
during 2013-2014. Although 98% of the tested A(H1N1)pdm09 virus isolates were sensitive 176 to oseltamivir by 2014 (8), large clusters of oseltamivir-resistant variants were detected in 177 
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Newcastle, Australia in 2011 (15) and Hokkaido, Japan in 2013-2014 (16). In the Japan 178 cluster, the oseltamivir-resistant virus was causing community outbreaks until it was 179 displaced by its oseltamivir-sensitive counterpart (Figure 2). We apply our method to 180 estimate the fitness of this oseltamivir-resistant strain using published data (16) and the 181 generation time distribution in case study 1. 182 3. A hypothetical study of AVR fitness and drug pressure under large-scale antiviral interventions 183 
during a pandemic. Oseltamivir resistance is not uncommon among influenza viruses with 184 pandemic potential, e.g. avian influenza A(H5N1) (17) and A(H7N9) viruses (18). We 185 consider a hypothetical but realistic situation in which large-scale antiviral interventions, 186 comprising both prophylaxis and treatment, are implemented during a pandemic that 187 comprises co-circulation of AVS and AVR viruses (7, 19-21). The epidemic parameters are 188 the same as that in Figure 2 with all individuals susceptible at time 0. We consider 189 situations in which (i) the AVR strain is intrinsically less transmissible than the AVS strain 190 with 0 0.95σ = ; and (ii) large-scale antiviral interventions reduce the AVS reproductive 191 number by a proportion μ such that drug pressure renders the AVS strain less transmissible 192 than the AVR strain, i.e. 0 (1 ) 1σ σ µ= − > . We consider 10%, 15% and 20% coverage of 193 antiviral prophylaxis that reduces susceptibility to the AVS virus by 81% (22); this 194 corresponds to μ = 0.08, 0.12 and 0.16, respectively. We assume that 0σ , σ  and μ are 195 unknown a priori and demonstrate how our method can be used to estimate them in real-196 time to inform optimal use of antivirals. Specifically, if AVR fitness is consistently estimated 197 to exceed 1 with high probability (say, above 0.9 for one week), then there is compelling 198 evidence that an increasing proportion of severe cases would be AVR and hence not 199 treatable with the antiviral. We assume that in response to this alert, antiviral use would be 200 suspended except for treating high-risk and severe cases as policymakers deliberate (i) how 201 to strategically adjust antiviral use to strike a balance between reducing transmission of 202 AVS infections and increasing the number of severe AVR infections , and (ii) whether 203 alternative treatment options such as convalescent plasma and antivirals with different 204 resistance mechanisms should be considered (7, 20, 21, 23). The objective of this case study 205 is to demonstrate how estimates of 0σ  and μ can be used to build an evidence base for this 206 decision-making process.  207  208 
Role of the funding sources 209 
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The sponsors of the study had no role in study design, data collection, data analysis, data 210 interpretation, or writing of the report. The corresponding author had full access to all the data in 211 the study and had final responsibility for the decision to submit for publication. 212  213 
Results 214 
Validating the method for estimating AVR fitness 215 
Figure 1 summarizes the accuracy and precision of AVR fitness estimates across a wide range of 216 plausible epidemic scenarios when AVR testing sensitivity and specificity are both 100% (a 217 reasonable assumption for genotypic testing). The reliability of fitness estimates depends on 218 epidemic characteristics mainly via the time span, expressed in terms of number of generation 219 intervals, during which the AVS and AVR strains are both circulating in significant proportions. 220 Fitness estimates are largely unbiased unless this time span is below 10 generation intervals 221 (around 30 days) and AVR testing capacity is low (<5 samples per day). Increasing the daily testing 222 capacity beyond 20 samples provides little improvement in the fitness estimates. The accuracy and 223 precision of fitness estimates deteriorate significantly when testing sensitivity and specificity are 224 both reduced to 90% which has a similar effect as halving the testing capacity (Figure A2 on page 225 
9 of Appendix).  226  227 
Timeliness of AVR fitness estimates 228 
Figure 2 illustrates the timeliness of reliable AVR fitness estimates for one stochastic realization of 229 an exemplary epidemic scenario. The AVS and AVR reproductive numbers differ by 5% which is 230 sufficiently high to result in fixation within a single epidemic wave. The daily AVR testing capacity is 231 10 samples, a modest level for well-resourced populations like Hong Kong. Our method correctly 232 predicts which virus would become dominant with posterior probability consistently above 0.9 as 233 early as three weeks before the epidemic peak. However, stochasticity has a strong impact on the 234 timeliness of reliable fitness estimates. Figures A3 (see Appendix page 10) shows two alternative 235 realizations of the same epidemic scenarios in which reliable fitness estimates are available a 236 couple of weeks sooner or later than in Figure 2. 237  238 
Case study 1: Oseltamivir-resistant influenza A(H1N1) virus, 2007 – 2008 239 The pooled (intrinsic) AVR fitness estimate is 1.04 (95% credible interval 1.03-1.05), i.e. the 240 oseltamivir-resistant strain was 4% (3%-5%) more transmissible than its contemporaneous 241 oseltamivir-sensitive counterpart (Figure 3). The fitness estimate increases (decreases) by 0.01 242 
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when we increase (decrease) Tg by one day. If the data were available in real-time, reliable fitness 243 estimates would have been available by late February 2008, which was 15 weeks after the 244 oseltamivir-resistant virus was first identified in Norway and months before it became dominant in 245 populations outside Europe (24). If we estimate AVR fitness in each population separately, the 246 results suggest that the oseltamivir-resistant strain was more transmissible than the oseltamivir-247 sensitive strain only in Canada, Luxembourg, the UK, Germany and France, but not in the other five 248 populations (Figure 3). In particular, there is no strong evidence that the oseltamivir-resistant 249 strain was more transmissible than its oseltamivir-sensitive counterpart in Japan (25). The intrinsic 250 AVR fitness estimates remain unchanged when the effect of drug pressure in Japan is explicitly 251 modelled (see Appendix page 4). 252  253 
Case study 2: Oseltamivir-resistant influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus in Japan, 2013-2014 254 We estimate that this oseltamivir-resistant A(H1N1)pdm09 virus was 24% (17%-30%) less 255 transmissible than the oseltamivir-sensitive strain that displaced it (Figure 4). Such differential 256 transmissibility was not detected by in vitro competitive growth and in vivo ferret transmission 257 experiments (16). In retrospect, our method could have correctly predicted that the AVR virus was 258 less transmissible that its AVS counterpart (with posterior probability > 0.95) after both viruses 259 had co-circulated for two weeks, which corresponds to four weeks before the AVR virus was 260 displaced. 261   262 
Case study 3: Estimating AVR fitness and drug pressure on the AVS strain under large-scale 263 
antiviral interventions during a pandemic 264 
Figure 5 shows that reliable estimates of 0σ  and μ are typically available within one to two weeks 265 after antiviral interventions are suspended. These estimates can be used to inform the optimal use 266 of antivirals. For example, if policymakers resume large-scale antiviral prophylaxis with coverage 267 equal to γ times the baseline level, then the resulting AVR fitness would be 0 (1 )σ γµ−  which can 268 be used to assess the downstream effect of increased AVR incidence, e.g. increase in case-fatality 269 risk due to more cases not treatable with antivirals. 270 
 271 
Discussion 272 We have developed a simple method for estimating AVR fitness from influenza AVR surveillance 273 data. Characterization of the nonlinear epidemic dynamics underlying surveillance data typically 274 
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requires inference of multiple parameters in transmission models (e.g. basic reproductive number, 275 reporting rate, etc.) (26). Our method bypasses such complexity and is therefore easy to implement. 276  277 Conventionally, AVR fitness is assessed based on in vitro experiments examining kinetics of 278 neuraminidases and virus replications in cell cultures, or in vivo experiments examining viral load 279 and virus transmission in animal models (27). As illustrated in our second case study, fitness 280 estimates from such laboratory settings do not necessarily conform with that observed in actual 281 community transmission settings (16). Moreover, as the 2007 experience showed, experiments 282 performed using different genetic background may give different results (28). Nonetheless, these 283 experiments are indispensable for early detection of transmissible AVR viruses. Our method 284 complements these experiments by providing population-level fitness estimates when both AVS 285 and AVR viruses co-circulate.  286  287 Timeliness of AVR surveillance depends on the capacity and turnaround time of AVR testing. 288 Current influenza AVR surveillance mainly relies on the WHO Collaborating Centers (WHO CCs) in 289 GISRS with antiviral susceptibility testing capacity available mainly in five WHO CCs, namely 290 Atlanta, Beijing, London, Melbourne and Tokyo (8). National influenza centers collect clinical 291 specimens and send representative virus isolates to one of the WHO CCs for more advanced 292 analyses. However, patient-specific clinical and epidemiological data for these isolates, such as 293 gender, age, geographic location, healthcare setting, antiviral treatment history and vaccination 294 status, are often incomplete or missing, especially when these samples are not collected by the 295 sentinel surveillance systems. Routine collection of these data (e.g. antiviral treatment history) can 296 enhance the performance of AVR surveillance.  297  298 The turnaround time of AVR testing depends on our knowledge regarding the genetic mechanisms 299 that confer AVR. If the genetic markers associated with AVR are known a priori (e.g. the NA H275Y 300 mutation (27)), the turnaround time for genotypic tests are usually 1-2 days. In contrast, 301 phenotypic tests for antiviral susceptibility (e.g. neuraminidase inhibition assay (8)) are necessary 302 for monitoring emergence of  AVR strains with previously unknown AVR mechanisms (27). 303 Phenotypic tests are much more labor intensive than genotypic tests with a turnaround time of 1-2 304 weeks. Following the discovery of a new strain with unknown AVR mechanism, further 305 investigations would be needed to characterize the associated genetic markers. As such, real-time 306 surveillance for novel AVR strains will likely incur a lead time of at least several weeks.  307 
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 308 In our first case study, we estimate that the oseltamivir-resistant influenza A(H1N1) virus that 309 emerged and became globally dominant in 2007-2008 was 4% more transmissible than its 310 oseltamivir-sensitive predecessor. This is consistent with the findings in Chao et al (29) in which 311 the fitness advantage of the oseltamivir-resistant strain was estimated to be 1.7% to 2.4% based on 312 the rate at which it spread around the globe. Both studies indicate that an AVR strain with a fitness 313 advantage of as little as 2% to 4% would spread to fixation both locally and globally within months. 314 If large-scale antiviral intervention is implemented during a pandemic, the resulting drug pressure 315 on the AVS strain might confer such magnitude of fitness advantage to an intrinsically less 316 transmissible AVR strain. In such context, timely and robust surveillance of AVR fitness is essential 317 for informing optimal use of antivirals. For example, given that antiviral therapy will likely be the 318 first-line treatment for severe cases during a pandemic, an increase in AVR/AVS incidence ratio and 319 growing ineffectiveness of antivirals in treating AVR cases might increase the overall pandemic 320 mortality. Estimates of intrinsic AVR fitness and drug pressure on the AVS strain provided by our 321 method would thus be useful for assessing the risk of such outcome, though a comprehensive 322 evaluation of optimal antiviral use would require knowledge of additional parameters (e.g. 323 reproductive number, antiviral efficacy in reducing mortality, etc.) (30).      324  325 In our method, AVR fitness corresponds to the combined effect of intrinsic AVR fitness and the drug 326 pressure posed on the AVS strain by population-wide antiviral interventions. AVR fitness will vary 327 across populations if the drug pressure in each localities are different. Therefore, comparison of 328 AVR fitness estimates from different populations should account for heterogeneities in drug 329 pressure. We have demonstrated how to do this in our case study 1 in which we jointly estimate 330 intrinsic AVR fitness and drug pressure in Japan using data from 10 populations (see Appendix page 331 4). 332  333 Our study has several important limitations. First, our method is applicable only when AVS and AVR 334 strains co-circulate and hence cannot be used to estimate the fitness of a newly emerged AVR strain 335 that has not yet spread in the community. Second, our method requires accurate specification of the 336 generation time distribution. If data on exposure or onset times of infector-infectee pairs are 337 available, our method can be extended to jointly infer the generation time distribution (see 338 Appendix page 4). The resulting fitness estimate remains largely unbiased, but its precision would 339 be lower due to uncertainty in the generation time distribution. Third, our method has not 340 
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accounted for importation of AVS and AVR viruses. In the presence of such importation, our method 341 would still be valid if (i) cases with recent travel history are excluded from AVR surveillance and (ii) 342 the number of imported cases is small compared to incidence from local transmission (which is 343 generally the case after the local epidemic has undergone exponential growth for 1-2 weeks).  344  345 Timely and accurate estimates of AVR fitness is important during both inter-pandemic and 346 pandemic periods because the spread of AVR viruses can substantially attenuate the effectiveness 347 of antivirals. Robust real-time interpretation of AVR surveillance data for estimating AVR fitness is 348 thus an essential but currently missing function of AVR surveillance. Our method has the potential 349 to fill this knowledge gap and can be easily integrated into contemporary surveillance systems. 350  351 
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Figure 1. Validating the accuracy and precision of AVR fitness estimates when the sensitivity 
and specificity of AVR testing are both 100%. One hundred epidemic scenarios are randomly generated and 100 stochastic realizations of the data streams are simulated for each scenario (see Methods). AVR fitness is inferred at the end of each simulated epidemic. A Frequency distribution of the relative error in the fitness estimates σˆ  (i.e. ˆ1 [ ]E σ σ− )) across all scenarios and realizations when the daily AVR testing capacity is 2, 5, 10, 20 and 80 samples. The smaller the relative error, the more accurate the estimates. B Frequency distribution of the coefficient of variation of σˆ . The smaller the coefficient of variation, the more precise the estimates.
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Figure 2. A simulated example to illustrate the timeliness of reliable AVR fitness estimates. The epidemic parameters are (0) 1.4SR =  and  2.8 daysgT = . At time 0, 50% of each age group are susceptible and the epidemic is seeded with 10 AVS and 10 AVR infections. A-B Incidence of AVS and AVR infections in two fitness scenarios: σ  = 1.05 or 0.95. C-D The daily number of 
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reported cases. E-F The daily number of influenza-positive isolates that are AVS and AVR with a testing capacity of 10 samples per day. G-H Posterior distribution of the fitness estimate σ  on each day. Circles and error bars indicate the posterior medians and the 95% credible intervals, respectively. I-J The posterior probability that AVR fitness is above 1. 
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Figure 3. Surveillance data for seasonal influenza A(H1N1) and fitness estimates for the 
oseltamivir-resistant strain during 2007-2008 in Canada, Luxembourg, United Kingdom, 
Germany, France, Japan, Netherlands, United States, Norway and Hong Kong. A The number of positive A(H1N1) virus isolates and the number of oseltamivir-sensitive and resistant A(H1N1) isolates over time in each population. B Fitness estimates for the oseltamivir-resistant A(H1N1) virus under three assumed generation time distributions. The pooled AVR fitness estimate (at the top) is obtained by assuming that AVR fitness was the same in all populations.    
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Figure 4. Retrospective real-time fitness estimate for the oseltamivir-resistant 
A(H1N1)pdm09 virus that circulated in Hokkaido, Japan during the 2013-2014 influenza 
season. A Data on influenza A(H1N1) activity and AVR surveillance. B Weekly fitness estimate using the same generation time distributions considered in Figure 3.  C The posterior probability that AVR fitness was above 1.
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Figure 5. Estimating AVR fitness and drug pressure on the AVS strain posed by large-scale 
antiviral prophylaxis. The epidemic parameters are the same as that in Figure 2 with intrinsic AVR fitness 0σ   =  0.95. We assume that antiviral prophylaxis reduces susceptibility by 81% and the prophylaxis coverage is 10%, 15% and 20% so that the drug pressure μ is 0.08, 0.12 and 0.16, respectively. Large-scale antiviral intervention is suspended after the posterior probability of σ > 1 is greater than 0.9 for seven consecutive days. Cyan shade indicates the time period during which large-scale antiviral intervention is implemented. A The daily number of reported cases. B The daily number of influenza-positive isolates that are AVS and AVR with a testing capacity of 10 samples per day. C Posterior distribution of the AVR fitness estimate on each day. Circles and error bars indicate the posterior medians and the 95% credible intervals, respectively. D Posterior distribution of the estimates for drug pressure on the AVS strain at the baseline level (i.e. before large-scale antiviral interventions is suspended). E The posterior probability that AVR fitness is above 1. 
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